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With the emergence of the first BSE case in Germany in November 2000,
the fast erosion of consumer confidence into the safety of meat products
led to a rapid restructuring of government agencies and policy instru-
ments related to food safety.1 Similar to the release of information about
British BSE cases in Germany in 1996, the arrival of the first German
BSE cases in 2000 led to a highly intense and emotional reaction among
German consumers (Loy and Steiner 2004). This intense, though peri-
odic, mass-level attention to BSE is an important attribute of contested
governance (see chapter 1, this volume) that has proven to be more 
dramatic in Germany than in France or Britain (see chapters 6 and 7,
this volume). In November 2000, the mass-level attention to BSE not
only led to a reduction of beef eating by more than half, but had reper-
cussions for the entire food marketing chain, the animal breeding indus-
try, the catering business, and EU farm policy as a whole (“A New Type
of Farming” 2001, Fox and Peterson 2004).
Under political pressure, the federal minister of agriculture announced
the establishment of a new ministry branch solely devoted to food safety
only one week after the first BSE case was reported.2 Up to then, the
Health Ministry was fully responsible for handling food safety issues.
One month after the first BSE case, Chancellor Schröder announced that
BSE had become one of his-priority issues (Chefsache). When the federal
ministers of agriculture and health refused to consider further swift
changes, Schröder forced them to resign in January 2001 and named a
lawyer from the Green Party, Renate Künast, as the new minister of agri-
culture. For the first time in German history, the minister of agriculture
came from outside the sector. In addition to the changes in personnel,
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the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry was renamed the 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture.
In the light of these changes, an important question to ask is: to what
extent do the observed institutional governance modifications reflect 
continued contested governance in terms of public distrust, when it chal-
lenges the legitimacy of institutional arrangements related to food safety
(chapter 1, this volume)?3 This chapter attempts to address this issue by
exploring the scope and effectiveness of visual changes in governance in
Germany, including the policy instruments that were implemented to
address food safety issues and particularly the eroding trust in public
authority. The key role of regaining trust in public authority in this
process is echoed by policymakers themselves. Künast identified this as
her top priority, emphasizing that “trust through change must be our
motto” (Künast 2002). David Byrne, European commissioner for health
and consumer protection, announced, “Clearly there is a need to develop
trust. The food safety agencies, which have been established in many
European countries, serve as good examples. These agencies create a
credible and visible distance between different government structures
with the broad aim of increasing transparency which, in turn, bolsters
public acceptance and confidence” (Byrne 2004). However, before
exploring to what extent these calls for public trust and reduced con-
testation were more than cosmetic rhetoric, this chapter first considers
some specifics of Germany as they relate to food safety and food markets
in general.
German consumers could be characterized as highly price sensitive.
Discounters, for example, have gained a market share of close to 
40 percent, which is higher than in any other European country (M+
MPlanetRetail 2002).4 At the same time, only a small fraction of con-
sumers purchase organic meat, which consumers perceive as being safer
than conventional meat products.5
Given Germany’s traditional reliance on state intervention since the
Bismarck era, a shift toward more industry-led initiatives in the food
sector seems, at first sight, to be more challenging and more appropri-
ate than in other European countries. Industry-led initiatives, such as the
2001 voluntary national quality assurance scheme Quality and Safety
(QS), can be highly desirable in a world of increasingly differentiated
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food produce. With increasing complexity in the food system, a greater
reliance on market mechanisms that exploit the informational advan-
tages of decentralized market participants has advantages over state
intervention. This is because competitive forces can deliver efficient price
discovery by exploiting local and idiosyncratic information (Hayek
1945) and by giving important incentives, for example through reputa-
tion, that are necessary for the functioning of quality assurance schemes.6
At the same time, increasing complexity calls for a stricter separation of
tasks between markets and government and a stronger government focus
on auditing mechanisms and liability law.
Indeed, we observe an increasing degree of government intervention
along those dimensions when considering the food safety–related regu-
lations initiated by Künast, or EU directives related to food safety. To
emphasize, such intervention can generally be justified, since it is well
known that without intervention, the market fails to deliver the optimal
level of safety at the margin. The underlying problem of inadequate 
or asymmetric information can be addressed not only through the 
regulation of liability but also by public information provision and
through the mandatory implementation of minimum quality standards
or guarantees.7
The case for government intervention with regard to setting minimum
product quality standards is a critical one in the context of this chapter.8
In a world of increasing proliferation of brands and private quality assur-
ance systems, the problem of transparency and heterogeneity of product
quality standards can often be addressed more efficiently through man-
dated quality standards, since certified quality standards reduce infor-
mation cost to consumers about the safety level of quality attributes.
Significantly, product quality standards rather than process quality stan-
dards enable the industry to choose the most efficient way of achieving
a given level of food safety.9 In sum, since markets can help to resolve
failures related to food safety through competition and reputation, and
since governments can take an important role with regard to liability and
information provision, a balanced, accountable, and transparent division
of responsibilities poses the greatest challenge to a government trying to
regain consumer confidence and assure an optimal degree of food safety
at the margin.10
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This chapter explores the newly emerging mix of market and govern-
ment initiatives in Germany with regard to food safety, as exemplified
by QS and the reform of governance structures at the federal level. Fol-
lowing a discussion of the changing scope of governance with regard 
to food safety, the chapter discusses the effectiveness and efficiency of
the emerging reform elements of the new governance structures. In doing
so, this chapter tries to answer to what extent food-safety-related gov-
ernance in Germany remains contested. Finally, this chapter aims to
provide an outlook on emerging tensions between governance modes,
since these tensions are likely to determine the accountability, compe-
tence, and efficiency of forthcoming food safety regulations.
The Changing Scope of Governance
Given the federal structure and the institutions that are associated with
a “social market economy” such as in Germany, we expect that the
underlying system of governance as related to food safety is distinctly
different from other economies (Chandler 1990).11 However, before
exploring several changes in Germany’s governance structure related to
food safety, it is essential to identify what is meant by scope of gover-
nance, governance structure, and their role in shaping an incentive struc-
ture that underlies economic activity and political distress.
Following North (1990), Nelson and Sampat (2001), and vonTunzel-
mann (2003), the scope of governance can be captured by three key ele-
ments: process, structure, and control. In the context of this chapter, we
consider governance processes as the changing roles and relationships of
agents and agencies in the course of the BSE events in Germany.12 Gov-
ernance structure relates to the different forms through which decisions
are made. Structures can thus induce and govern collective decision
making. Finally, the capability of governance (competence) needs to be
captured: control refers to the power to make economic and policy deci-
sions through different structures.
In identifying the key parameters of regulatory organizations in OECD
countries, Scott (2003) suggests that there are at least three main com-
binations of form and power: organizations established and given power
by statute; organizations established without direct state involvement,
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through contracts or incorporation, but empowered by state legislative
instruments; and nonstate organizations exercising private regulatory
power (p. 309).13 For example, consider the contrast between conven-
tional modes of governance that rely on lengthy legislative processes, and
more flexible governance modes such as those that rely more heavily on
regulatory agencies or voluntary standards (e.g., QS). Lengthy legislative
processes are more vulnerable to political and lobbying influences due to
their structure as compared to the more robust and flexible structure of
regulatory agencies in a social market economy, which are likely to
undergo appropriate checks and balances. They are, therefore, more
likely to be accountable and democratically legitimate (Persson, Roland,
and Tabellini 1997). This is perhaps where the economic view of scope
of governance is echoed most closely in the political view of contested
governance, in terms of its challenge to the legitimacy of existing 
institutional arrangements, and in terms of its sectoral or multisectoral
scope (chapter 1, this volume). Consider that the new institutional eco-
nomics literature refers to a governance structure as the institutional
framework within which the integrity of a transaction is decided
(Williamson 1979, 235). The elements of such an institutional frame-
work, the institutions themselves, are the humanely devised constraints
that structure political, economic, and social interaction (North 1991,
97). According to North (1991), these institutions consist of the infor-
mal constraints (sanctions, customs) and formal rules (laws, property
rights) that define part of the choice set of economic agents and thus
determine the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activ-
ity (p. 97). These informal constraints and formal rules lie at the heart
of those conditions that either challenge or support the legitimacy of
existing institutional arrangements, and can therefore be directly associ-
ated with contested governance in the sense of Ansell and Vogel (chapter
1, this volume).
Given a mix of formal and informal constraints, the power of making
economic and policy decisions through the above structures often fails
to deliver equity and efficiency. We can identify several forms of failures
that are responsible here: market failure, government failure, corporate
failure, and network failure. There are two reasons why these different
modes of failures should not be considered in isolation in the context of
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our analysis. First, we are interested in exploring changes in the scope
of governance following the BSE outbreak in Germany as they relate to
the changing scope of contestation. Consider that the interrelationship
between different modes of failure can be directly linked to the BSE out-
break. Government failure exacerbated market failure by relying on
intransparent decision making and thus hampering economic incentives.
Due to inappropriate liability rules at the farm and processing level, as
well as inadequate and asymmetric information in the provision of rumi-
nant feedstuff, a market failure emerged. But inadequate liability rulings
at the level of public authorities, and thus the failure to align incentives
between principals and agents in the political hierarchies, were also most
likely important reasons for the BSE outbreak.
As a further example, consider the UK, where the specified bovine offal
ban failed for at least two reasons. First, it failed because of noncom-
pliance of industry participants. Second, it failed because government
officials who were in charge of designing and enforcing the ruminant
feed ban did not act in the interest of society. Government officials
decided to lower the temperature for treating animal protein in feedstuff
processing while their decision-making process took place in the absence
of public scrutiny.14 Therefore, the conditions that led to the outbreak
of BSE may be regarded as a prime example for contested governance.
Ansell and Vogel (chapter 1, this volume) argue that contested gover-
nance is particularly likely where intense public scrutiny confronts an
extensively institutionalized policy sector in which day-to-day routine
decisions are delegated to experts or administrators with little ongoing
attention or interest from the public.
The second and related reason that supports an analysis of the inter-
relationship between the above modes of failure relates to the three 
ideal types of governance modes: markets, networks, and hierarchies
(Thompson et al. 1991).15 Importantly, two types of hierarchies can be
distinguished here, the corporate hierarchy (large firms) and a country’s
political hierarchies.16 This division between governance modes is par-
ticularly relevant here, since this chapter argues that a transparent and
sharp distinction between the roles of markets and political hierarchies
is desirable in resolving contested governance with regards to food safety.
The following sections explore these issues more explicitly, by analyzing
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the key dimensions of changes in the political hierarchies in Germany,
and by examining changes in a market-led initiative, both of which aim
to address contestation in food safety matters.
A Voluntary National Quality Assurance Scheme: Quality and Safety
(QS)
The shift in incentives for the German food demand chain to implement
a large-scale QS scheme after the BSE events is a further reflection of the
shifting balance of regulation away from publicly mandated food safety
regulations and more toward industry-led initiatives.17 Several authors
have explored general incentive and adoption issues of such quality
assurance schemes at the industry level (Henson and Caswell 1999;
Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker 1998).18 However, given the scope of this
chapter, the following sections attempt to describe the functioning of the
QS scheme, highlight its actual and potential weaknesses, and explore
its broader relevance in the context of German food safety regulation
and contested governance.
The following discussion focuses on the new QS scheme for three main
reasons. First, in contrast to the limited coverage of other retailer-led
schemes, the QS scheme reaches across the entire demand chain for meat
and meat produce as well as fruit and vegetables.19 Second, it takes an
interesting intermediate position in terms of incentive provision to the
food demand chain, as it combines elements of a voluntary industry-led
quality assurance scheme and a publicly mandated set of food safety reg-
ulations. Third, largely due to the composition of its members, the cau-
tious criticism of Minister Künast (Die Zeit 2003, Agrar.de 2003), and
a recent BSE test scandal (Putz 2004), QS has become a focus of public
debate that longs to be viewed through the lense of contested governance.
In October 2001, representatives from the German farmers’ federa-
tion, the federations of feed processors, meat processors, and retailers
joined together with the Central Marketing Association of German Agri-
culture (CMA), to form a limited liability corporation with the objective
of establishing a national label and quality assurance scheme for con-
ventionally produced meat and meat produce.20 Each of the federations
has a veto right and sends two representatives to an advising committee,
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whose task is twofold. First, it sets the control criteria according to which
independent auditors are asked to classify and accredit system partici-
pants.21 Second, it defines and interprets the criteria according to which
the assigned label is set up and communicated to the outside world.
Two further institutions were established: the sanctioning committee
and the board of trustees. The sanctioning committee consists of three
members: a lawyer, a judge, and an expert sworn to impartiality. This
committee rules over system participants that have not adhered to the
control criteria established by the advising committee. It then imposes
penalties according to guidelines that are established by the advising
committee. The other institution is the board of trustees, whose func-
tions lie in public relations and advising the sanctioning committee.22 In
order to reduce a centralized administrative burden, key demand chain
members, such as cooperatives, packers, and slaughterhouses, have
become the local administrative centers for producers, who then become
associated producers.
The structure of controls has three dimensions: the firm-level self-
control, an independent auditing, and a control of the auditing. Cur-
rently this control of the auditing is performed by the QS corporation
itself or by independent auditors chosen by QS. Independent auditing
occurs randomly, but auditors have to announce their visit at least one
week in advance. The auditors check on physical criteria such as hygiene
and administrative criteria such as documentation. Some criteria are
exclusion criteria, but after passing those, each farm obtains an index
number. Depending on the percentage of criteria fulfilled, farms get clas-
sified as QS standard 1, 2, or 3. For example, a pork producer who has
been classified into QS standard 1 has three years before he can expect
the next auditor on his farm (two years for QS standard 2, and one year
for QS standard 3). There are several incentive problems with this
system. First, it is not made public into which QS standard a system par-
ticipant (and thus his product) has been classified. Second, the auditing
frequency differs according to species (higher for beef than for pork) and
level of system participant (key distinction between farmers and local
administrative centers). Third, the auditing frequency and stringency is
particularly low at the retail level. As soon as more than 10 percent of
retail outlets in a given chain have achieved a given QS standard, this
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QS standard will automatically be granted to all the remaining outlets.
Once a retail chain has been granted QS standard 1, only 10 percent of
its outlets will be randomly selected for auditing (15 percent annually
for QS standard 2 and 20 percent annually for QS standard 3).
Given the inexperience with this type of quality assurance scheme, it
is of interest to examine the practical implications for the alliance
members further. Beyond the mandatory federal requirements in terms
of documentation of origin and medication, the use of antibiotics is more
strictly regulated under QS. Growth antibiotics were permitted for the
production of piglets and in the early fattening stages of pork produc-
tion until January 2004. A total ban on growth antibiotics has now been
implemented throughout the life cycle of all animals. However, the use
of GM feedstuff as well as the use of fully slatted floors in pork pro-
duction is still permitted (Putz 2004). Another important implication for
farmers is the compulsory monitoring of Salmonella status, which
exceeds the general mandatory federal regulations. The data about the
Salmonella status of an individual animal as well as a classification of
the entire farm are fed into a central Salmonella database. From there,
farmers and slaughterhouses can access the data. Initially sow herds were
exempt so the coverage of the Salmonella monitoring was incomplete
until January 2004. Further, there are no implications and specifications
on the farm or any other level regarding GMOs or animal welfare cri-
teria. As slaughterhouses, processors, and retailers have to comply with
federal regulation regarding traceability in any case, there is no addi-
tional impact from QS.
Since the initiation of the QS system, the first certified produce
appeared on the markets in September 2002, while the first QS meat was
sold through Wal-Mart. Clearly, that was a message to all those who
believed that QS would automatically guarantee higher retail and pro-
ducer prices.
However, for the first time in German history, a voluntary national
quality assurance scheme was established. As regulators are interested in
the efficient provision of a desired level of food safety, this should be
seen in a positive light since we need to consider economies of scale asso-
ciated with safety-specific capital.23 With QS, as with other schemes of
vertical integration, firms can obtain the necessary minimum efficient
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scale of production. Nevertheless, after one year, QS had achieved only
a limited coverage of the entire sector with about 50 percent of pork and
32 percent of beef produced under the QS label (October 2003). This is
surprisingly low, given that QS originated as a result of safety problems
in the beef sector. Beginning in early 2004, QS auditing also started in
the fruit and vegetable sector. Furthermore, system participants hope 
that QS would improve international competitiveness of QS-certified
fruits and vegetables, since QS audits will be embedded in the global
system of EUREPGAP audits.24
With the key objective of establishing a quality assurance scheme that
covers the entire food demand chain based on hazard analysis and crit-
ical control points principles, the QS scheme has achieved standards only
slightly greater than Germany’s mandatory standards: its criteria rest
generally on existing mandatory standards and are distinct only in terms
of a more extensive data management system (which is meant to improve
traceability) and increased Salmonella monitoring. According to those
criteria, QS fulfills EU Food Safety Law 178/2002 in terms of traceabil-
ity and self-control.
In sum, what are the most critical points of the QS system? Given its
limited coverage in terms of total production, it appears that the system’s
credibility remains limited as long as there is leeway for members of the
demand chain to circumvent the system. More striking is that the very
reason for establishing the QS label does not appear to be taken seri-
ously. According to Foodwatch, an independently funded German orga-
nization for consumer rights in the field of agricultural and food policy,
nine German farms were identified where QS-certified beef was not tested
for BSE (Putz 2004). Furthermore, considering the institutional structure
of the QS system, the role of the sanctioning committee appears 
questionable in two ways. First, a potential conflict of interest emerges
because the sanctioning committee imposes sanctions according to guide-
lines that were established by the advising committee. Second, and most
important in the view of the declared objective of improving trans-
parency, the names of the system members who violated the QS criteria
and were punished with sanctions are not made public. Further, the lack
of transparency with regard to participants’ QS classification and the low
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auditing frequency deserve to be emphasized again. Also, the Salmonella
monitoring scheme is insufficiently rigorous, as there are no bacterio-
logical examinations of the animals required.25 Problems with establish-
ing a more rigorous Salmonella monitoring scheme can only be
anticipated from the fact that the German government had previously
led a voluntary national eradication and disease control program, which
was abandoned by the end of 1999 due to lack of participation.
Some critical issues extend further to the butchers and the retailers.
The butchers’ association has refused to join the label, based on two
points. First, butchers argue that the additional compliance costs will not
be counterbalanced by a higher consumers willingness to pay. Second,
the butchers believe that their quality standards are already above QS
standards. Results from a recent study (Loy and Steiner 2004) suggest
that butchers have indeed been able to charge higher prices compared to
supermarkets.26 As several studies have confirmed, German consumers
appear to value the personal relationship with a butcher more than
placing their trust in an “anonymous label” (Nielsen 1998, Wirz 1996).
The fact that butchers have not joined the QS system, although they cur-
rently account for about 40 percent of meat sales in Germany, is a further
indication of the inability of the QS corporation to communicate the
label’s benefits to consumers, beyond those that are conveyed through
the current mandatory standards.
Further, consider the retail level. The QS scheme started as a retailer-
led quality assurance scheme, with its first meat being sold through
Walmart. Many producers and food processors were thus implicitly
forced to adopt QS standards or lose their outlets. Clearly, with an
increasing concentration at the retail level, it is important to keep
antitrust issues in mind.
In total, and accounting for the tightened standards as compared to
the initialization stage, QS appears to have only slightly lifted the overall
level of food safety beyond the current mandatory state regulations.
However, it appears striking that a quality assurance scheme was put
into place with little rigor first, before more stringent measures were
adopted. This may be rational with regard to minimizing system par-
ticipants’ initial compliance costs. But it is unlikely to be a successful
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long-term strategy with regard to regaining consumer confidence and
market share. Consider that at present, the QS label appears to carry a
low informational value, since it is difficult to communicate to consumers
the differences between the QS label and the required standards objec-
tively. Beyond the complexity of the underlying standards, a low con-
sumer valuation is also anticipated due to a continuing lack of consumer
trust. This is due not only to the fact that most of the information about
QS originates from its system members, but also because German con-
sumers continue to be surprised by undesirable substances in the food
demand chain (May 2002: nitrofen in organic wheat; July 2003: dioxin
in feedstuff).
Nevertheless, due to its broader scope and larger scale than previous
industry-led quality assurance schemes, the implicitly improved standard
harmonization could in principle be seen in a positive light with regard
to consumer information. Consumer choice could be improved due to
the reduction in the complexity of labeling and standards information.
Due to the greater comparability of standards, transparency leads to
greater competitive pressure on other sector participants to differentiate
themselves. A continuing proliferation of domestic and international
retailer- or producer-led quality assurance schemes could be expected 
to appear on the German market. Consumer gains could thus be in 
terms of price, but whether consumers gain in terms of information 
provision is likely to be determined by how industry players and the 
government find a balance between standards regulation and label 
proliferation.27
Further, since QS system participants have developed the Salmonella
monitoring system based on the European Parliament’s regulation on the
control of salmonella, QS is likely to serve as the basis for a faster and
more efficient introduction of the expected mandatory regulation.28 In
the future, it should also guarantee a smoother compliance with the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) (COM
2004) which started to operate in May 2005. But beyond the Salmonella
criteria in QS, it is also the establishment of a central database that has
anticipated recent EU regulation with regards to traceability.29 Given
these potential harmonization benefits, it will be interesting to continue
to observe the forthcoming governance interplay between political and
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corporate hierarchies, especially after the recent reform of federal min-
istries and regulations in Germany.
The Reform of Food Safety Regulation in Germany
The most visible change in the scope of governance that can be associ-
ated with food safety issues relates to the renaming of the Federal Min-
istry of Food, Agriculture and Forestry the Federal Ministry of Consumer
Protection, Food and Agriculture (BMVEL) in January 2001. This
occurred only one day after the federal minister for health and the federal
minister for agriculture were forced to resign.
The following section outlines the changes in governance structure
before attempting an assessment of these reforms. Throughout, this
section will relate to a study of the German court of auditors, which was
initiated by Chancellor Schröder at the end of 2000 (“von Wedel
Report”; von Wedel 2001). This 127-page report, which was published
in July 2001, is particularly insightful for two reasons. First, its editor
was the president of the German federal court of auditors and, at the
same time, the federal commissioner for operating efficiency in public
administration.30 Second, the report came about with the cooperation of
experts of the court of auditors, the BMVEL, as well as an advising com-
mittee that consisted of representatives from farmers, consumers groups,
and science.
The renaming of the ministry had an immediate structural conse-
quence. The Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection (BgVV) was
placed under the jurisdiction of the BMVEL and finally dissolved in
November 2002. The BgVV’s responsibilities were then taken over by
three federal institutions: the BMVEL, the newly created federal institute
of risk assessment (BfR), and the newly created federal office for con-
sumer protection and food safety (BVL), with the latter two both created
in November 2002. The BfR is responsible for risk analysis, risk com-
munication to policymakers and the public, and cooperation with the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Agrarbericht 2003). Risk 
management responsibilities (including the admission of pesticides) and
the coordination of joint control functions between the federation 
and the federal states were taken over by the BVL. The reform of these
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institutions has very much followed the blueprint of the von Wedel
report.31
The report’s criticism focuses on three traits of the previous scope of
governance: the fragmentation of food safety–related responsibilities
across federal ministries, the lack of an independent scientific center
advising the BMVEL, and the lack of coordination between the federa-
tion, the federal states, and the EU in matters of food safety.
Fragmentation of Responsibilities
After the immediate reorganization of the BMVEL in January 2000,
there were still food safety–related tasks for which the BMU (federal min-
istry for the environment, nature conservation, and nuclear safety), the
BMWI (federal ministry for the economy and technology), and the BMG
(Federal Ministry of Health) were responsible. The von Wedel report
found that there were eighteen subordinate federal institutes engaged in
food safety matters. In order to address this fragmentation, lack of coor-
dination, and in response to the chancellor’s intention that food safety
matters should be concentrated within the BMVEL, the report contained
two main suggestions. First, food safety tasks should be bundled within
the BMVEL after a reorganized working structure of its departments.
Second, a complete reform of the central policy department within the
BMVEL was proposed to account for future strategic issues such as
policy planning, coordination in research, and coordination in EU
matters. While the bundling of food safety responsibilities has taken
shape in the current BMVEL, the second proposal of the von Wedel
report has not been implemented.
Establishment of an Independent Scientific Center for Risk Analysis
Within the structure of the previously established federal ministries, there
was no scope for interdisciplinary risk analysis related to food safety.
Therefore, the von Wedel report proposed the establishment of such a
center with the following tasks: (1) collect, analyze, and evaluate infor-
mation on food risk (risk analysis and risk communication) in order to
provide objective and preventative policy advice; (2) serve as an inter-
mediary between the BMVEL and national and international research
institutes; and (3) serve as representative to the EFSA. The report rec-
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ommended that this center be part of the BMVEL (in budgetary terms,
with an independent governing status), that it have the power to con-
tract research projects out, and that it be guaranteed independence
through similar principles and measures that rule for the Deutsche Bun-
desbank. Given the unresolved budgetary issue and faced with the diffi-
cult task of overcoming principal-agent (incentive) problems that would
underlie such an associated center, it is not surprising that this part of
the proposal has not been put into practice in its original form.
The BfR in its current form considers itself to be the scientific body of
the Federal Republic of Germany in matters of food safety. Legally it is
a self-governing public institution, which is meant to provide the neces-
sary scientific independence. It aims to prepare expert reports and opin-
ions on questions of food safety and consumer health protection on the
basis of internationally recognized scientific assessment criteria (BfR
2003). With the help of risk analyses, it aims to formulate action options
for risk reduction. Its tasks include the provision of scientific advice 
to the federal ministries concerned with food safety matters and the 
publication of original research and risk assessments to the public in 
a transparent and comprehensible manner.32 Further, the BfR is engaged
in scientific cooperation with other international institutions and orga-
nizations that are involved in consumer health protection and food
safety. The BfR takes a role that more closely resembles that of AFSSA
in France (see chapter 6, this volume), since its role as a public body for
risk assessment is strictly separated from risk management. This con-
trasts with the UK reforms, where risk assessment, management, and
communication functions are combined within the FSA (see chapter 7,
this volume).
Addressing the Lack of Coordination at the National and EU Levels
In anticipation of the foundation of the EFSA, the von Wedel report
focused on organizational weaknesses at the level of the federation, as
well as on the division of responsibilities between federal states and the
federation. In the past, the federation was only partly responsible on food
safety matters. The responsibility was limited to the creation of laws at
the level of the federation, as well as to cooperating responsibilities with
EU institutions. Given Germany’s constitution, the central role of the
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federal states was and still is in the sphere of execution (monitoring food
quality, feedstuff, and the private veterinary sector). In order to fulfill the
joint tasks of the federation and the federal states in terms of risk man-
agement, risk evaluation, and risk communication, the von Wedel report
suggested the creation of a more output-oriented “coordinating agency
of the Federation” (KSB). Created in its governance structure as a mirror
image to EU governance structures, this KSB has been established
through the BVL (federal office for consumer protection and food safety).
Its associated responsibilities lie in the establishment of a central inter-
nal data network for food safety issues and the harmonization of control
standards and crisis management, such that the KSB functions as inter-
cept for the European Rapid Alert System. However, two recommenda-
tions of the von Wedel report have not been followed so far: that the
data collected through the KSB be made public and that the KSB be used
as a mechanism for exploring the legal appropriateness of existing lia-
bility laws.
Beyond the reform of the BMVEL and its related institutions, the gov-
ernment enacted several other initiatives. On August 6, 2002, a law for
the “new organization of consumer health protection and food safety”
was passed in the upper house of the federal government. This legisla-
tion established not only the BfR and the BVL, but also relabeled the
pesticide regulation, the epidemic regulation, and the feedstuff regula-
tion to provide conformity with the newly labeled BMVEL. The gov-
ernment also invested about $13 million to support the national research
initiative on TSEs (transmissible spongiform encephalopathies). In addi-
tion, the government has reformed the liability laws by integrating con-
sumer rights into the BGB (the German civil code), making it easier 
for consumers to sue individual firms and for consumer groups to sue
associations.
Continued Contestation or Improved Competence, Accountability, and
Legitimacy?
The 2001 Agriculture Report of the BMVEL, published on February 14,
states that “the BSE scandal marks the end of agricultural policy of the
old type. In the future, consumer protection in these sensitive areas of
196 Steiner
agricultural and food policy will be given priority over economic inter-
ests (Agrarbericht 2001).”33
In an attempt to explore the issue of remaining contestation in the
above context and in the sense of Ansell and Vogel (chapter 1, this
volume), it appears necessary to ask which traits of the reformed scope
of governance can be linked to continuing public distrust in authority
that challenges the legitimacy of existing institutional arrangements. This
chapter suggests that the lack of the following governance traits as
related to food safety can be used to reflect upon this issue:
Competence34
• The capacity to select and replace ill-founded food safety policy 
instruments
• The capacity to design and implement well-founded food safety policy
instruments (e.g., the capacity to judge whether risk is acceptable or not)
Accountability
• The aptness of institutions to respond to changing demands and
insights from citizens (democratic accountability from within)
• The readiness of governing institutions to respond to evolving scien-
tific knowledge and feedback from other democratic institutions (exter-
nal democratic accountability)
• External and internal accountability require transparency: only when
the operation of governance structures is transparent can a critical flow
of information be returned from citizens and science to the institutions
themselves.
A further issue that is not covered in the above view of competence
and accountability, yet which emerges in the context of Germany’s
federal system, is the characterization of governance in terms of cen-
tralization versus decentralization and its effect on the competence of
governance. It appears that the reduction in fragmentation of food
safety–related responsibilities through the establishment of the BMVEL
in its current form has led to a more competent scope of governance.
Further, with the established separation of risk management from risk
analysis and risk communication through the BfR and BVL (which
mirrors European governance structures as implemented in the EU Food
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Safety Law 178/2002), accountability has also been, in principle,
improved.
Regarding transparency, this chapter has stressed the lack of it on
several occasions above, including in the context of the BfR. This may
prove to be the greatest weakness in terms of improving the food indus-
try’s and government’s accountability.
In sum, it appears that contestation in food safety matters has been
reduced when judged in terms of competence and accountability. Initially,
and following the decree of Chancellor Schröder for organizational
reform in January 2001, a mere rebundling of responsibilities has been
observed, without effective reform efforts related to food safety issues.35
Largely due to the von Wedel report, this temporary peak in politiciza-
tion has subdued. However, only the emergence of critical safety 
situations will prove how accountable and competent the governance
structure will remain.
Effectiveness and Efficiency in a Changing Scope of Governance
The following section presents a brief assessment of effectiveness and
allocative efficiency as it relates to the current scope of governance in
food safety matters.
Effectiveness In order to consider the effectiveness of the reformed
institutions more explicitly, the following criteria are employed:
(i) Achievement of goals inherent in the implemented regulations and
policies
(ii) Appropriateness of regulatory burden in its context
(iii) Facilitation of verification and traceability
(iv) Strengthening of liability law
(i) The von Wedel report has established the fragmentation of the old
Ministry of Agriculture as one of the main deficiencies to be resolved.
Since the goals of the report were, in this respect, put largely into prac-
tice, it appears that the current governance structure represents a
major—and yet overdue—improvement. However, without knowledge
of the time allocation of individual ministries and branches on food
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safety–related aspects and the corresponding achievement of specific
goals, it is difficult to provide further judgment.
(ii) Given the bundling of responsibilities and the reduction in fragmen-
tation, the regulatory burden through multiple and overlapping gover-
nance structures is likely to be reduced. The establishment of the BfR is
important for improving the effectiveness of food safety regulations
through conducting and promoting research in general, and through the
use of cost-benefit analysis in particular. Since it is currently unknown
to what extent the BfR uses cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory process
(no such information was made public until June 2005), only the
observed promotion of research and the associated establishment of a
data network hint of an improvement in terms of regulatory effective-
ness. Further, the above caveat in terms of lacking data transparency
looms large.
(iii) The government’s attempt to establish a voluntary Salmonella mon-
itoring scheme that ensures traceability and facilitates verification has
failed. Instead traceability has been achieved through the QS’s Salmo-
nella monitoring scheme and the central Salmonella database.
(iv) Finally, with regard to producers, consumers, and consumer groups,
liability rules have been improved.
Efficiency Efficient governance mechanisms are those that align incen-
tive problems between agents that frequently occur due to the separa-
tion of ownership and control (Williamson 1998). Good governance thus
aims to align incentive problems in order to permit the realization of
(mutual) gains between agents. There are several ways by which the
achievement of such gains may be hampered. In the face of the previ-
ously discussed changes in scope of governance, this section will briefly
focus on issues of authority, liability, and risk.
Authority, Decentralization, and Efficiency As Aghion and Tirole
(1997) have emphasized, a gain in terms of efficiency can be made by
giving up some control, that is, giving away real authority, even though
formal control remains a top priority.36 Considering the stricter bundling
of food safety–related tasks at the federal level, the improved communi-
cation between federal ministries due to the reduction in overlap of
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responsibilities, together with a more transparent decentralized federal
governance structure, it is likely that the current governance structure is
more efficient than previous ones.
Liability and the Provision of Information From an efficiency point of
view, it is desirable to use food safety regulation and liability rules jointly
in order to control for risk related to food safety hazards (Shavell 1984,
Skogh 1989, Antle 1995).37 Although an improved regulation of the pro-
vision of risk-related information helps to ensure and preserve con-
sumers’ freedom of choice, informational failures need to be addressed
through standards and liability.38 Since 2001 we have observed tighter
liability rules that should strengthen deterrence. Together with an
improvement of risk assessment, communication, and management that
appears to have been made (through the establishment of the BfR and
the BVL), it is likely that the balance between regulation and liability has
been improved.39 So far, considering information made public, it does
not appear that much risk-related research has been performed in rela-
tion to food safety matters. It appears that in striving for more efficient
risk regulation, the BfR should address important issues, such as: how
do consumers respond to different communication efforts of the gov-
ernment, and how does consumers’ capacity to use differently formatted
information vary?40
In sum, the reformed food safety regulation appears suited to improve
efficiency through the emphasis on information provision, standards, and
transparency as these help to safeguard consumers’ freedom of choice.41
Since we observe some improvements in liability law and standards reg-
ulation and would expect that fewer resources are needed to achieve the
acclaimed risk-related goals in the newly reformed governance structure,
efficiency gains should be observed. Nevertheless, the lack of deterrence
due to the reduction in potential liability that comes with the limited
publication of risk data is likely to hamper efficiency (it is also in this
sense that the QS scheme is inefficient by not publishing the identities of
firms that defected).
Risk Standards, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Issue of Risk Perception
When risk standards (standards to protect health) are used for choosing
among different food safety regulations, a major concern is that the costs
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of different policy options may not enter into the design of risk stan-
dards, and standard setting is likely to reflect evidence of risk biases and
responsiveness to political factors (Viscusi and Hamilton 1999). This
calls for the use of cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, since governance
decisions at the federal level need to account for private efforts to ensure
food safety such as the QS initiative, cost-benefit analysis should be used
to facilitate the identification of effective intervention points in the food
demand chain and the identification of efficient mixes of mandatory and
voluntary quality management systems (Unnevehr and Roberts 1997,
Caswell 1998).42 The general importance and pitfalls of cost-benefit
analysis for regulatory decision making are well established (Nichols
1991; Arrow et al. 1996). But importantly with regard to food safety,
standard cost-benefit has also been refined to take account of scientific
uncertainty, in ways that balance the precautionary principle against the
benefits of waiting to learn before taking action (Gollier 2001).43 This
raises three issues related to the legitimacy of the BfR, the BVL, and the
governance reforms as such. First, since it is unknown, at this stage, to
what extent the BfR makes use of cost-benefit analyses, it is difficult to
judge how efficient the operations of the BfR and BVL are along these
lines (there are no publications that reveal its actual use, although the
BfR’s Web site proclaims that it is “developing concepts” for cost-benefit
analysis (BfR 2005)). Second, from the published information it is not
known to what extent the precautionary principle is actually integrated
into cost-benefit research at the BfR. Third, even if this is done, it is not
evident what role the precautionary principle takes as part of the
reformed food safety regulations. However, in providing reformed insti-
tutional arrangements that reduce distrust in public authority and thus
reduce challenges to legitimacy, the specification of a clear and trans-
parent role of the precautionary principle in a newly emerging scope of
governance should be given high priority.
Given consumers’ different capacities and thus efficiency of using
various forms of information, it is to be expected that consumer het-
erogeneity will pose further challenges to the work of the BfR and the
BVL.44 Since German consumers have proved to be more sensitive than
other European consumers with regard to food safety scandals and the
provision of food safety information, consumer heterogeneity and the
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resulting problem of efficient allocation of risks should be part of the
BfR’s research agenda. An interdisciplinary research effort appears par-
ticularly appropriate, just as the von Wedel report has suggested, since
this is likely to help in analyses to adjust the subjective risk to the objec-
tive one.45 Future research could control for these aspects by taking
advantage of the strengths of choice experiments from surveys, combin-
ing it with market data (Louviere et al.1999; Louviere, Hensher, and
Swait 2000).
In sum, risk research should not degenerate to a governance market-
ing effort that aims at reducing perceived risk associated with search,
experience, and credence attributes. Rather, a multidisciplinary research
effort on risk perception is important for an efficient design of gover-
nance structures and a regaining of institutional legitimacy, since knowl-
edge of perceived risk helps to rationalize and depoliticize risk assessment
and those governance options that both the BfR and BVL have on their
agenda. In doing this, those interested in the effectiveness and efficiency
of the evolving scope of governance in Germany may wish to consider
Viscusi’s findings as their paradigm: “As in the case of risk perception
biases, the most disturbing aspect of these potential market failures is
that the government policies intended to eliminate the shortcomings
often appear to be driven by the same set of influences” (Viscusi 1990:
261).
Conclusion
Six weeks after the first BSE case emerged in Germany, the foundations
were laid for a sweeping reform of governance structures related to food
safety: within forty eight hours, both the minister of health and the min-
ister of agriculture were forced to resign, and a lawyer and member of
the Green Party became head of the former Federal Ministry of Food,
Agriculture and Forestry. The ministry was simultaneously renamed the
Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture. This
chapter has explored an emerging mix of market and government ini-
tiatives in Germany with regard to food safety, as exemplified by an
industry-led, voluntary national quality assurance scheme and the reform
of federal level governance structures involved in food safety issues. Since
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both mandatory regulations and markets, through reputation and com-
petition, can serve to provide appropriate incentives and constraints with
regard to food safety matters to actors in the food industry, the func-
tioning and implications of QS were considered together with the
reforms of governance structures at the ministerial level.
Before the actual changes in the different aspects of governance were
discussed, an attempt was made to explore the key elements of scope of
governance—that is, structure, control, and process—together with the
evolving mix of types of governance modes in a more general context.
This permits a clearer assessment of governance elements that follows
with regard to aspects of competence, accountability, effectiveness and
efficiency. In turn, it enables us to explore the extent to which the chang-
ing scope of governance faces ongoing public distrust that challenges the
legitimacy of those newly reformed institutional arrangements (chapter
1, this volume).
This chapter suggests that the QS scheme has lifted the overall level
of food safety only slightly above the one supplied by the current manda-
tory state regulations. This is largely due to an attempt to implement a
more rigorous Salmonella monitoring system and the need to satisfy all
members of the demand chain that participate in the QS system. A low
informational value of the label is asserted, since it is difficult to com-
municate to consumers the differences between the QS label and the 
generally required mandatory standards objectively. But beyond the
complexity of the underlying standards, a low consumer valuation is also
expected due to a continuing lack of consumer trust. Public distrust has
only recently received a boost due to allegations of failures in BSE testing
(Putz 2004). However, given the broader scope and larger scale of the
QS scheme compared to previous industry-led quality assurance schemes,
the implicitly improved standard harmonization should, in principle,
positively affect consumer information and consumer choice. Neverthe-
less it appears that in practice the standard harmonization has taken
place at such a low level that those informational gains to consumers are
outbalanced by the fact that the QS label masks shortcomings that are
not likely to be anticipated by consumers (neither GM feedstuff nor
animal welfare criteria are currently part of the QS certification; the
auditing procedures are not stringent enough to be effective). As a result,
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diminishing consumer trust may spill over to other existing or forth-
coming labeling schemes.
However, since QS system participants have developed a Salmonella
monitoring system based on the European Parliament’s regulation on the
control of salmonella, QS could serve as the basis for a faster and more
efficient introduction of the forthcoming mandatory regulation at the EU
level. In the future, the QS scheme should also guarantee smoother com-
pliance with the proposed European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC). But beyond the Salmonella criteria in QS, it is also the
establishment of a central database, and thus traceability, that is antici-
pating forthcoming EU regulation. In sum, the introduction of QS
appears to have brought little, if any, immediate consumer gains in terms
of improving consumer choice and information, yet its pioneering char-
acter and large scope across the food demand system appear to have
brought some gains with regard to the implementation of future institu-
tional and regulatory changes. Since the German government must ulti-
mately defend itself in terms of traceability measures and Salmonella
monitoring in relation to the EU, these regulatory gains from QS may
help to reduce contested governance in the interplay between market-led
and government-led food safety initiatives.
The chapter goes on to explore governance changes with regard to the
restructuring of German federal ministries and the government’s initia-
tives with regard to liability issues and information provision. Along with
the criticism and reform proposals of a report of the German court of
auditors, the chapter considers three aspects of the scope of governance
before 2000, which are all relevant to exploring the extent of distrust in
public authority and the legitimacy of the underlying institutional
arrangements. First, the fragmentation of food safety related responsi-
bilities across federal ministries; second, the lack of scientific advice and
research that links more directly with the Ministry of agriculture; and
third, the lack of coordination between the Federation, the federal states,
and the EU in matters of food safety. Accounting for the most recent
governance changes, it appears that the governance in food safety
matters is less contested in the sense of Ansell and Vogel (chapter 1, this
volume), and as judged in terms of competence and accountability. Given
the bundling of responsibilities and the reduction in fragmentation that
has taken place, the regulatory burden is also likely to be reduced.
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The establishment of the federal institute of risk assessment (BfR) and
the federal office for consumer protection and food safety (BVL) in
November 2002 was a credible attempt to separate risk analysis and risk
communication from risk management. This approach is similar to the
developments in France with the introduction of AFFSA (see chapter 6,
this volume), but differs sharply from the UK approach, in which risk
assessment, management, and communication are combined within the
FSA (see chapter 7, this volume). The creation of the BfR is important
for improving the effectiveness of food safety regulations through con-
ducting original research and promoting research in general, and through
the use of cost-benefit analysis in particular. Since it is currently unknown
to what extent the BfR uses cost-benefit analyses in the regulatory
process, only the promotion of research and the associated establishment
of a data network suggests that regulatory effectiveness is likely to be
improved. Also, liability rules have been improved for producers, con-
sumers, and consumer groups. Nevertheless, lacking transparency with
regard to data access to the outside world remains a problem.
Finally, this chapter attempts to make a brief efficiency assessment of
the emerging governance structures. Considering a more focused and
decentralized division of authority together with tighter liability rules
that should strengthen deterrence, the governance reform promises effi-
ciency gains. Together with an improvement of tasks related to risk
analysis, communication, and management, it is likely that the balance
between regulation and liability has been improved. Further, the
reformed food safety regulations appear suited to improve efficiency
through the emphasis on information provision, standards, and trace-
ability, as these help to safeguard consumers’ freedom of choice. Never-
theless, the lack in deterrence due to the reduction in potential liability
that comes with the limited publication of risk data is likely to hamper
efficiency.
Also, the recent and repeated defeat of the government’s “information
law” for consumers at the upper house of parliament must be seen as a
setback for restoring trust in public authority. Further, extensive con-
sumer consultation, as it is practiced in the UK through a dedicated 
consumer consultive committee (chapter 7, this volume), is also largely
missing in practice, although the BfR proclaims risk communication as
an interactive process and dialogue. These two conditions are all the
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more important with regard to continuing contested governance, since
effective risk communication is essential for building credibility, trust in
public authority, and thus enhancing the legitimacy of institutional
arrangements.
In view of the danger that the costs of different policy options may
not enter into the design of risk standards and that standard setting is
likely to reflect evidence of risk biases and responsiveness to political
factors, this chapter suggests that cost-benefit analysis should be imple-
mented at various stages in the planning and decision-making process of
German food safety regulations. It is not currently evident whether or to
what extent the BfR is making use of these tools. Further, a multidisci-
plinary research effort on risk perception, which should be linked to the
BfR, is important and should be initialized in order to account for crit-
ical issues related to consumers’ risk perception. To initialize such an
effort appears important for an efficient design of governance structures,
since knowledge of perceived risk helps to rationalize and depoliticize
risk assessment and those governance options that both the BfR and BVL
have on their agenda.
A final comment is in order with regard to the internal accountability
and thus legitimacy of German governance structures related to food
safety. Following the BSE crisis in Germany, it was a report by the
German court of auditors that came about with the cooperation of con-
sumer groups, farmers, and ministry officials that proposed sweeping
changes in the scope of governance. Many of these changes have been
implemented, anticipating forthcoming developments at the EU and
international levels (Codex Alimentarius). In this sense, it appears that
Germany’s federal system has, due to its reliance on consensus building,
been successful in improving the legality, effectiveness, and contestation
of German food safety regulations.
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1. See Loy and Steiner (2004) for a review of the history of the BSE crisis in
Germany and an exploration of price-setting behavior in the beef supply chain
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related to the 1996 BSE events. Fox and Peterson (2004) provide more detailed
scientific background on BSE and a chronology across Europe.
2. The Health Ministry was, up to then, fully responsible for handling food
safety issues.
3. “Throughout his book, North [1981] . . . argues that good institutions will
simultaneously support private contracts and provide checks against expropria-
tion by the government or other politically powerful groups. There is a growing
consensus among economists and political scientists that the broad outlines of
North’s story are correct: the social, economic, legal and political organization
of a society, i.e., its ‘institutions,’ are a primary determinant of economic activ-
ity.” Acemoglu and Johnson (2003: 4).
4. In 2002, the sales of discounter Aldi alone grew by 16 percent (M+MEuro-
data 2003).
5. Organic share of total food production in 2000: 2.2 percent (Hamm, Grone-
feld, and Halpin 2002).
6. As we know from information economics, there is a role for government inter-
vention, since Hayek’s (1945) fundamental insight into market efficiency only
holds when markets operate in the absence of imperfect information. A more
refined argument would also need to take account of trade and industrial orga-
nization issues, such as the observed increasing concentration in the German food
industry. These issues raise new concerns related to multilevel governance. Issues
related to credence attributes will be discussed below.
7. Evidence of this is found in Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002, which created
the European Food Safety Authority and established traceability at all stages in
the food marketing chain.
8. Both extrinsic quality attributes (e.g., “QS label”) and intrinsic quality attrib-
utes (e.g., “organic”) have an impact on the quality perception of consumers.
Intrinsic quality dimensions include, therefore, process attributes that are not
observable at the point of purchase and may thus lead to market failure (even
from ex post observations, the buyer can never be certain of the quality of the
services he or she purchased (Emons 1997)). The literature (Nelson 1970) has
therefore differentiated credence attributes from experience attributes (whose
utility is assessed after purchase by actual consumption) and search attributes
(which can be determined by inspection without the need for consumption).
9. In this sense, the European Commission has opted for efficiency: the White
Paper on Food safety promotes food safety standards and emphasizes that food
safety is related to the attributes of the products, not to a specific method of 
production.
10. Persson et al. (1997) make this call for accountability and transparency very
clear in their analysis of political accountability: “Another relevant problem is
how to increase the accountability and transparency of decisions in the Euro-
pean Union: witness the handling of the mad-cow disease by the European Com-
mission” (p 1199).
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11. Scholars in other areas, for example finance, have argued that we can dis-
tinguish national systems of governance, as defined by their methods of decision
making and the underlying balance of power (Albert 1993). Consider also that
presidential and parliamentary democracies involve different incentive structures,
informational asymmetries, and thus scope for abuse of power (Persson, Roland,
and Tabellini 1997).
12. This is meant to include changes in information processes, such as changes
in a newly regulated information exchange between local and federal ministries.
13. “Paradoxically the last of these is often the most independent and most pow-
erful because of its capacity to combine each of the three regulatory functions
of rule-making, monitoring and enforcement, without the involvement of any
other organizations.” (Scott 2003, 309).
14. Fox and Peterson (2004) also emphasize the importance of cross-contami-
nation of feed, in mills, and on farms, which is difficult to detect because of a
lack of reliable tests.
15. “The key feature of networks . . . is the way cooperation and trust are
formed and sustained within networks. In contrast to either hierarchy or market,
networks coordinate through less formal, more egalitarian and cooperative
means.” Thompson et al. (1991, 18).
16. See Libecap (1992) for early evidence of the interrelationship between these
hierarchies, as they were shaping the first federal food quality guarantees in the
United States (1887–1891).
17. See Fearne, Hornibrook, and Dedman (2001) for previous retailer-led beef
quality assurance schemes in Germany.
18. Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco (2001) consider the adverse consequences on
firms that may result from market forces (reputation, market share, revenue),
food safety regulations (penalties) and product liability law (legal and compen-
sation expenses).
19. A quality management system is in place in the dairy industry. The objec-
tive of the dairy industry is to align it with the QS system.
20. Most of the following factual information originates from the official website
of QS: <www.q-s.info/de.>
21. Auditors operate according to DIN 45011.
22. The board of trustees consists of twelve members. It is made up of acade-
mics, politicians, a union representative, a member from the German consumer
association, and a representative from the sugar industry.
23. This point deserves further emphasis since German meat production, par-
ticularly of pork, is characterized by much smaller production units as compared
to other European partners. The lack of large, homogeneous supplies is likely 
to lead to further competitive pressure, as German processors and retailers are
likely to look beyond the German border as soon as others have adopted QS
standards.
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24. Key specifics of EUREPGAP are: transparency, recognition of existing
schemes and programs via benchmarking, and an easy to adopt good agricul-
tural practice protocol that is based on a master HACCP plan (no full HACCP
exercise at the farm gate).
25. No judgment can be made regarding the actual status of infection; it is
merely possible to judge whether an animal had contact with Salmonella in the
past.
26. Also, in the wake of the 1996 BSE crisis in Germany, they appear to have
been able to adopt a more consistent pricing strategy, as reflected in lower price
variability (Loy and Steiner 2004).
27. Consider also that the German government does not intend to replace QS
by any national set of regulations (BMVEL 2003).
28. See directive 2001/0176 (COD) and 2001/0177 (COD), as in COM(2003)
434, 16.7.2003.
29. EU Food Safety Law 178/2002 took effect on January 1, 2005.
30. Since January 2002, Dr. von Wedel has been a member of the European
court of auditors.
31. Following the von Wedel report, a working group on the “reorganization of
consumer health protection” was convened in the BMVEL and published its find-
ings and proposals in December 2001 (BMVEL 2001).
32. “The assessment results will, in principle, be made publicly accessible whilst
maintaining the confidentiality of protected data.” (BfR 2003).
33. “Der BSE-Skandal markiert das Ende der Landwirtschaftspolitik alten 
Typs. In Zukunft hat der Verbraucherschutz in diesen sensiblen Bereichen 
der Agrar- und Ernährungspolitik Vorrang vor wirtschaftlichen Interessen.” 
(Agrarbericht 2001).
34. Williamson (1998) differentiates governance structures in terms of their cost
and competence.
35. “Es unterblieb eine umfassende interne Reorganisation, mit der Anliegen des
gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutzes entsprechend ihrer politischen Bedeutung
gebündelt worden wären.” (von Wedel, 2001; 27).
36. Aghion and Tirole (1997) focus on a moral hazard setting (agents can take
actions that are unobserved to others) with costly monitoring, which appears
most suited in the present context.
37. When it is inefficient to address market failures through tort liability, there
is need for regulation.
38. Issues related to inadequate and asymmetric information (credence qualities)
have been discussed above. Liability can be shared, in a hierarchy, or it can be
shifted among agents, each of which has different efficiency implications. Sunding
and Zilberman (1998) analyze the case of shifting liability among firms and con-
sumers, when agents follow what are perceived to be reasonable actions that
result in accidental injury.
Governance Reform of German Food Safety Regulation 209
39. With “tightened” liability it will be more feasible to sue with lower trans-
action costs. Further, the legal instruments will be more suited to provide deter-
rence, assuming that firms correctly anticipate the compensation that would be
imposed by the legal rules (Viscusi 1989a). An improvement of liability rules
along those lines will, through the reduction of transaction costs, help to ensure
that a level of food safety is provided that is socially optimal. Consider that lower
transaction costs may also be achieved through the court system itself, due to
clearer liability rulings.
40. Viscusi and Magat (1992) discuss the conditions under which different types
of information provision instruments are effective. Just et al. (2002) extend exist-
ing models of value of information by incorporating consideration of individu-
als’ varying capacity to use differently formatted information and variation in
their information needs.
41. The current refusal of the QS system to make the Salmonella status public
could also be seen in this light: if the Salmonella status is disclosed, consumers
could overestimate the uncertain outcome of contracting Salmonellosis with a
certain probability. The level of meat demand would thus be suboptimal.
However, a transparent system means also that scientists and the media have a
role in transmitting the information to consumers such that these market fail-
ures can be averted.
42. See Unnevehr and Roberts (1997) for a discussion of cost-benefit analysis in
the context of microbial food safety.
43. The precautionary principle asserts that uncertainty should never be used as
a reason for postponing risk prevention efforts (Gollier 2001).
44. It is well known that it is important to account for the endogeneity of risk:
consumers differ in their marginal productivity of self-protection (Ehrlich and
Becker 1972, Shogren and Crocker 1999).
45. See Viscusi (1989b) for analyses that account explicitly for the relationship
between consumers’ perception of risk and actual risk.
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